



z POLITICAL STABILITY Q AND 







COLIN A. HUGHES 
•11 
• H I S 
3 4067 03174 6257 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
INAUGURAL LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF 
QUEENSLAND, i i OCTOBER 1966 
POLITICAL STABILITY 
AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR 
by Colin A. Hughes, M.A., Ph.D., 
Professor of Political Science, 
University of Queensland 
UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND PRESS 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Firsf published and copyright 1968 
University cj Queensland Press, St. Lucia, Queensland 
Text set in Monotype Beuibo il on 12 
Text paper. Two sided Matt Printing 23 x 36 x 53 lb. 
Printed in Australia by The Courier-Mail Printing Service, 
Campbell Street, Bowen Hills 
Registered in Australia for transmission by post as a book 
National Library of Australia registry number Aiis 67-1366 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
I DO NOT THINK it Very likely that anyone here tonight has had the 
fortitude, or has been so despairing of a nice night's entertainment 
elsewhere, to have attended all the inaugural lectures which have been 
delivered at the University this year. There have been a great many 
of them, and there are more to come. The process has been going on 
all over Australia, and a conspicuous element in the proliferation of 
new chairs and new departments has been a rapid growth in the 
number of those whose province has been variously called politics, 
or political science, or political theory and institutions, or government, 
by the bodies defining them. Six new professors have been appointed 
or taken up their appointments within the past twelvemonth, and two 
more are currently being sought. They should bring the total to 
seventeen, and leave only three universities unattended — all in New 
South Wales. Not surprisingly, half a dozen of them will be found 
in Canberra, which has more politics per head of population than 
other university cities. 
Some further evidence of the rapidity of this population growth 
may be seen in the fact that one of the current advertisements seeks 
a successor for Macmahon Ball, the first full-time teacher of political 
science at an Australian University, now about to retire. Indeed only 
two Universities do not still have their foundation professors: Sydney 
where F. A. Bland retired some years ago and from which his successor, 
P. H. Partridge, has moved to another university, and the Institute of 
Advanced Studies of the Australian National University, which 
suffered the tragic and untimely loss of Leicester Webb. In one case, 
my own, the creation of the Department of Government has been by 
a process of amoebic fission, but in each of the others an entirely new 
department has appeared by spontaneous germination. 
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This is perhaps an appropriate point at which to record my gratitude 
to Gordon Greenwood, both for personal kindnesses in the past and 
for his efforts on behalf of the subject when it was embraced within 
the combined Department of History and Political Science, and to 
a trio who played Moses to us latter-day Aarons and kept us together 
in the wilderness — S. R. Davis of Monash, D. W . Rawson of the 
Australian National University, and B. B. SchafFer of Sussex. Any 
distinction which the Department may enjoy for many years to come 
will be attributable to the cntliusiasm and professional competence 
of the four of them. 
Despite this rapid growth of the last decade on both sides of the 
Tasman, Australasian political science still employs relatively small 
battalions. In only a handful of departments do staff yet number more 
than a dozen. In Australia the total number of lecturers or more 
senior staff engaged in the full-time teaching of political science is just 
nearing the one hundred mark. Inevitably so small a profession finds 
it hard to generate very many of its own ideas, much less its own 
controversies, and so tonight certain of the cudgels I propose taking up 
are imported, and the broad lines of the controversy to which this 
lecture is addressed have been drawn elsewlicrc. 
One rough and ready, and avowedly unflattering, classification of 
many Australian academic disciplines is according to whether they 
look primarily to Great Britain or to the United States of America for 
leadership. Although political scientists born in Britain are still much 
more common in Australia than those of American origin, and 
although, at least until very recently, more Australians completed 
postgraduate studies in political science in Britain than in America, in 
the last few years I think our principal styles have come from the 
United States. On numbers alone it was probably inevitable that a 
system containing 700 universities teaching political science and a pro-
fessional association of 10,000 members would draw a much smaller 
body into its orbit. It is perhaps also inevitable that as this happens 
some overly enthusiastic novice will cry: "All the way with Harold 
Lasswcll!" Much of what I have to say this evening partakes of such 
a declaration. 
Certainly the study of political institutions and political obligation 
has a long and distinguished history. Some of this antiquity is indicated 
by the contemporary fashion of referring to Aristotle as the great-
grandfather of the subject - although a vociferous minority prefer to 
trace their antecedents to Plato and to keep bringing him into the 
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conversation all the time. But it is barely a century since the study 
of politics began to separate itself from philosophy, law, history, and 
the other social sciences. The first chair of political science was estab-
lished at Columbia in 1857 for the refugee German scholar, Francis 
Leiber. For the remainder of the nineteenth century the infant subject 
remained much influenced by the historical school of jurisprudence 
founded in Germany, genetic in approach, preoccupied with the 
growth of the legal and political institutions of the countries grouped 
around the North Atlantic basin. Political theory too drew its dominant 
idealism from Hegel and his successors. 
During this time two of the four main categories of what is now 
called "traditional" political science developed: the historical and the 
analytical, embracing constitutional law and political philosophy. 
Around the turn of the century a third strand was added, the prescrip-
tive, which argued for particular reforms and institutions. It was much 
influenced by the Progressive movement in the United States, although 
obviously it represents a revival of what had always been an element 
in political writing from the time of the Greeks. About this time, in 
1903, the American Political Science Association was established to 
provide a professional forum for practitioners. The fourth strand, 
which has been called the "descriptive-taxonomic" — "gathering the 
facts, classifying the facts, and describing political institutions and 
processes" — has undergone rather more evolution than the other 
three. Its early emphasis lay on formal, juridical structures; most West 
European political science remained frozen at this stage until well after 
the Second World War. However in the United States it gradually 
turned to a functional orientation which brought out the importance 
of non-governmental or para-governmental organizations such as 
pressure-groups and parties, and their interaction with state institutions. 
Lord Bryce is the exemplar of the stage. This emphasis on systems-in-
action led to dissatisfaction with existing techniques and concepts and 
the need for new sets more suited to studying the dynamics of govern-
ment. 
The middle period is characterized by the school at the University 
of Chicago led by Charles Merriam. It drew many of its new techniques 
from psychology and sociology. Following the work of Stuart Rice 
it adopted techniques of quantification not previously employed in 
political studies. Merriam and an Englishman, George Catlin, then 
teaching at Cornell, sought the key to political understanding in power 
relationships. However the Chicago school had limited success in 
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converting their contemporaries, and most political scientists continued 
to practise their trade within the confines of the four strands of 
traditional political science just mentioned, even though some notable 
figures began to work in a second field as well as political science — 
R. M. Maclver for example. 
The dissatisfactions remained, reinforced by a growing concern with 
the methodological deficiencies of the subject. Eventually a major 
challenge to traditional pohtical science emerged, based on a demand 
for new units of analysis, new methods, new techniques, new data, and 
the development of systematic theory. Refugee scholars in the 1930's 
gave an impetus to the growth of political sociology influenced by the 
ideas of Weber, Durkheim, Marx, and those grouped by Burnham as 
the Machiavelhans — Mosca, Pareto, Michels. From my own ex-
perience as a student, Franz Neumann could be mentioned, but 
Australia too drew some youthful reinforcements from continental 
Europe at this time. Participation of social scientists in various admini-
strative activities during the Second World War stimulated a practical 
bias. The Social Science Research Council and the Humanities 
Division of the Rockefeller Foundation interested themselves in 
propaganda and communication. In 1945 the Social Science Research 
Council decided to create a committee on Political Behavior and 
thereby provided a name for the new movement. 
The phrase, "political behaviour", had been used before. In his 
1925 presidential address to the American Political Science Association, 
Charles Merriam had predicted: 
Some day we may take another angle of approach than the 
formal, as other sciences do, and begin to look at political 
behavior as one of the essential objects of inquiry. 
In 1928 an American journalist, Frank Kent, had used it for a title, 
but by political behaviour he meant cynical realism. In 1937 the Swede, 
Herbert Tingsten, had used the phrase again: to mean voting. It was 
the 1945 S.S.R.C. definition which was to become accepted: 
Focused upon the behavior of individuals in political situations, 
this approach calls for examination of the political relationships of 
men — as citizens, administrators, and legislators — by disciplines 
which can throw light on the problems involved, with the object 
of formulating and testing hypotheses, concerning uniformities 
of behavior in different institutional settings. 
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Six years later David Truman provided what remains the best gloss: 
Roughly defined, the term political behavior comprehends those 
actions and interactions of men and groups which are involved in 
the process of governing. . . . At the maximum this conception 
brings under the rubric of political behavior any human activities 
which can be said to be a part of governing. . . . The ultimate 
goal of the student of political behavior is the development of a 
science of the political process. 
Lest the selection of the name to be inscribed on the banner of those 
discontented with traditional political science seem too inevitable, too 
purposive, I must retell a cautionary tale wliich bears on the point. 
At the time, a subcommittee of the United States Senate was con-
sidering the need for a national science foundation and the possible 
inclusion in its field of competence of the social sciences. As David 
Easton recounts it: 
Whether through genuine error or design, there were some 
disapproving senators who, from the floor of the Senate, insisted 
upon talking of social science as socialist science. To abort the 
growth of further confusion, the phrase "behavioral sciences" is 
said to have been coined to refer to all living systems of behavior, 
biological as well as social, an underlying idea being that it would 
serve to identify those aspects of the social sciences that might 
come under the aegis of a foundation devoted to the support of 
hard science. 
Unfortunately the tactic has led to some coirfusion. There had 
already been in the field the behavioristic school of psychologists, 
particularly associated with the name of J. B. Watson, and concerned 
to exclude from scientific psychological research "such subjective 
data as purposes, intentions, desires, or ideas". In fact no political 
scientist since Bentley in 1908 has fallen under the sway of Watsonian 
behaviorism, but any stick will do to beat the dog, and political 
scientists who admit to being behaviouralists will even today find the 
sins of Watson laid at their door. 
Time does not permit a proper cataloguing of the debate that raged 
aroimd the development of behaviouralism in the ten or fifteen years 
that followed 1945, about its essence, its application, its strengths and 
weaknesses, its sinister effects, or its promises of brighter tomorrows. 
But it is necessary to give some more elaborate explanation of what 
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is sought, and I shall adopt the list of its assumptions and objectives 
formulated by Easton in 1962. They are eight in number. It seeks 
regularities, "discoverable uniformities in pohtical behavior . . . (which) 
can be expressed in generalizations or theories with explanatory and 
predictive value". It seeks verification: the validity of these generaliza-
tions must in principle be testable. It emphasizes techniques for 
acquiring and interpreting data. In particular it emphasizes quantifica-
tion. It takes the view that ethical evaluation and empirical explanation 
involve two different sorts of proposition and must be kept separate, 
although it does not hold (as is so often alleged against it) that the 
ethical evaluation is impossible or improper — merely that when 
either is stated separately or in combination there should be no con-
fusion between them. It emphasizes systematization: 
Theory and research are to be seen as closely intertwined parts 
of a coherent and orderly body of knowledge. Research un-
tutored by theory may prove trivial, and theory unsupported by 
data, futile. 
It regards political science as a pure science, in that understanding and 
explanation of political behaviour must precede efforts to utilize 
political knowledge to solve social problems. And, finally, it emphasizes 
integration of all the social sciences. This integration can take place 
at any one of three levels: problem solving, in programmes of research 
training, or in the training of a single individual. The key idea is 
the conviction that there are certain fundamental units of analysis 
relating to human behavior out of which generalizations can be 
formed and that these generahzations might provide a common 
base on which the speciaHzed sciences of man in society could 
be built. 
So far a number of alternative fundamental units have been utilized: 
actions, decisions, input and output, functions, systems, roles, groups, 
cultures, and communications. None has been adopted by more than 
a hmited number of researchers. There has been much greater agree-
ment about techniques: the probability sample survey which is 
undoubtedly the most widely known innovation in the field of politics; 
the mvention of new methods of measurement such as scalogram and 
factor analysis, applicable not only to material secured from surveys 
and aggregate votmg data but to legislative and judicial voting records 
as well; the refinement of observational tecliniques applied to small 
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and medium-sized groups. Many outside the movement have been 
deeply suspicious of such techniques, but the more imaginative have 
conceded their utflity even when they were reluctant to try them 
themselves. May I quote from Sir Keith Hancock's presidential 
address to the History section of the 1965 ANZAAS congress. Apart 
from a lamentable preference for the anglicism nobbery, the counting 
of nobs, to the grecian psephology, the counting of pebbles, for what 
we poor students of elections try to do, he gracefully conceded that 
doing sums was not a sin and took issue with an American historian 
who had attacked "the bitch goddess Quantification" with the 
observation: 
. . . Quantification is neither a goddess nor a bitch nor a mixture 
of the two; but an honest working woman. When historians 
choose to employ her, she will give them useful service, within 
the limitations of her capacity. 
But, as I have just said, although behaviouralists have agreed on the 
techniques of measurement, they have not agreed on the basic unit 
of behaviour to be quantified. 
Nor has there been any clear sign of the emergence of a general 
theoretical framework to contain all empirical research. The one 
"discernible suggestion" of such a theory has been equihbrium 
theory, and it is to this that we must now turn if the requirement 
of systematization is to be met. While the concept of equilibrium was 
popularized by seventeenth century astronomy, it had been used in 
political writings long before: Lord Shang in China, Kautilya in 
India, and Machiavelli in Renaissance Europe had each noted the 
tendency of states to combine against their more powerful neighbours. 
Balance of power between states and checks and balances among 
organs of constitutional governments have been the two most per-
suasive, and prevalent, uses of an equilibrium model, but it has been 
employed elsewhere, as in swing of the electoral pendulum which 
we shall consider in a few minutes. We can take our definition of 
equilibrium from the writing of a student of international relations, 
Quincy Wright: 
An equihbrium is a relationship among forces operating upon or 
within an entity or group of entities so that the whole manifests 
in some degree some form of stability. The whole lacks the logical 
structure of a plan or the functional structure of an organization, 
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anc 
id its stability is explained not by its principles but by the 
properties of its parts, the relations among them, and the forces 
influencing them. 
The concept has been used in two different ways: as a mode of 
analysis (Easton suggests we should call this "general equihbrium"), 
which implies that all the elements or variables within a political 
system are functionally interdependent and that they will tend to act 
and react upon each other to a point where a state of stabihty will 
exist, even if only momentarily; and more narrowly as a description 
of mutual restraint among various power groups, normally within a 
constitutional system (Easton proposes "constitutional equilibrium" for 
this). The balanced constitution has had its champions in Polybius, 
Montesquieu, and the authors of The Federalist Papers. 
The difficulty of employing equilibrium theory lies in the uncertainty 
of the elements of the model. What are the entities whose opposition 
maintains the equilibrium ? How is the power of each to be measured ? 
There is the further difficulty of whether equilibrium refers to a 
condition of stability which changes only gradually, or whether it can 
permit oscillations of very large duration and scope. Various sorts of 
equilibrium have been given names to cover this: stable and unstable, 
dynamic, oscillating and adaptive. Two useful quahfications have been 
provided: one, employed by the economists since Schumpeter, is the 
recognition that empirical economic systems are in a constant state 
of disequilibrium, moving towards or away from equilibrium through 
"neighbourhoods of equilibrium" but never arriving; the other, 
formulated by Merriam, utilizes the idea of a "moving equilibrium". 
In a great many political situations one can identify the entities 
fairly easily: individual citizens, or groups, or organs of government. 
Bendey, the founder of group theory, made much use of equilibrium 
analysis; indeed for him the task of political science was to ascertain 
how the equilibrating tendency came into existence, how it took its 
form, and how it changed over time. It is the problem of measurement 
which is much more diflicult. Despite the flowering of group studies 
I know of only one attempt to compare the effectiveness of two 
pressure-groups, and Kristianson's recent book on the Returned 
Servicemen's League shows how difficult it is to establish the effective-
ness of even a single body. Easton warned that in quantification 
we would be seeking to trace the way in which the various 
groups possessing power use it to shape policy: the way in which 
lO 
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the power of one group influences the position of all other power 
groups, the reciprocal effects of the latter's power, and the ensuing 
authoritative allocation of values. We would be identifying all the 
power elements in a situation, showing how they interact with 
one another to produce a particular policy. 
This would be the equilibrium pohcy; no group in the political 
system would seek to change it because at this point the group would 
have maximized the returns from its exercise of power. As in 
economics, we could compare the real situation and attribute its 
departures to the influencing elements. But can we ever construct an 
adequate index of the political power held by each competing group ? 
Easton in 1953 concluded that we could not at that time and that 
employment of equilibrium theory as the conceptual basis for political 
research would involve excessive preoccupation with problems of 
quantification, a danger so great that he advised the temporary 
abandonment of equilibrium theory, even though he conceded that it 
was very useful in conveying certain very important ideas: that the 
parts of the political process were mutually dependent, so that change 
in one part would affect the whole, thereby emphasizing plural 
causation and that the interrelated parts tended to cohere; while 
through its employment of a moving equilibrium it properly em-
phasized problems of political change. 
I think that the time has come to look again at Easton's warning; 
thirteen years is a long time in the history of political science as a 
discipline of study. In the first place no other "discernible suggestion" 
of general theory has come forward to take the place of the equilibrium, 
and it continues to be widely employed in popular discourse. If 
political science is to seek the systematization of a science, then general 
theory must be pursued vigorously. Of course there are many who 
deny the possibility of general theory, who in Michael Oakeshott's 
words from that most influential of inaugural lectures believe that the 
most we can hope to do is "to keep afloat on an even keel" because we 
"sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbour for 
shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting place nor appointed 
destination". I certainly do not want to suggest that general theory, 
once discovered, wiU draw the vessel steadily forward, like the cable 
on the Moggill ferry, but rather that, once it is located, like the Pole 
Star on a cloudy night it will provide some fitful guidance to even the 
shortest voyages. Equihbrium theory remains the closest that we have 
II 
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come so far to identifying such a guide. 
Secondly, the dangers of excessive emphasis on quantification no 
longer appear so serious. Certainly much technique has been used to 
estabhsh the obvious at great trouble and expense, but there will 
always be sorcerers' apprentices who will misuse or waste the powerful 
tools given them. The better articles and books by the abler political 
scientists can contain figures, and graphs, and formulae, and still be 
about politics and tell the reader something that he did not know 
before and be important to an understanding of how the political 
process works, why states and leaders rise and fall. 
There is one other caveat of Easton's against employment of 
equilibrium theory in its constitutional equilibrium variety which 
I should mention. There is, he said, a danger that a normative quality 
wliich stems from ethical propositions about the mean and equilibria 
dating from Aristotle may attach itself to research in this field. One 
suspects that Americans, drawing in checks and balances with their 
mothers' milk, are more liable to this danger than those who come 
on the idea later in life and see it purely as a bit of eighteenth century 
machinery. But is there a danger that people will study the equihbrium 
because it is a good thing? Well, if so, is this a wholly bad tiling? 
Behaviouralists should guard against accepting their critics' charges 
that value-free research is amoral; we know enough of the sociology 
of knowledge to know how the ethical and psychological predisposi-
tions of the researcher will determine his field and style of work. 
Again, cannot research bear some relation to the values of the society 
promoting it? Are not the dangers of political instabihty so magnified 
that dehberate cultivation of factors promoting stability is advisable ? 
To adopt one of the ablutionary similes so popular with local con-
troversiahsts recendy, are we likely never to wash the baby lest we 
throw it out with the bath water? Can we not study the equihbrium 
as a central pohtical concept and utihze the behaviourahsts' weaponry 
to do so ? 
Although Dahl said in 1961 that the batde of behaviouralism had 
largely been won in the United States, and was able to subtide his 
article "Epitaph for a monument to a successful protest", the batde in 
other countries is still being fought. In March of this year, for example, 
the new Professor of Pohtical Theory and Institutions at the University 
of Liverpool, F. F. Ridley, was still prepared to challenge be-
haviourahsm on a number of grounds: that it tended to coUect 
information from those with the least power, and those with a great 
12 
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deal of power would be unamenable to its techniques; that it advocated 
integration of the social sciences, when being a good psychologist or 
a good sociologist was a full-time profession in its own right, and he 
who tried to be a master of all would only produce trivial results; that 
emphasis on political activity rather than the state abandoned the great 
themes of political thought. He went on to argue from this that the 
study of the state was best carried on through the study of constitutions 
and constitution-making. I do not think that I do Professor Ridley 
a disservice when I say that I suspect that a number of Australian 
pohtical scientists would be of this persuasion, nor that I am delivering 
a particularly underhanded blow by adding that I would once have 
agreed with him myself. Arthur Macmahon used to quote to us a 
dictum that improvised autobiography is the lowest form of instruc-
tion; he attributed it to Sidney Hook, and such is the respect of his 
former students for Macmahon's learning that I at least have never 
presumed to check the reference. It does have considerable force, and 
so I hope a properly apologetic note enters my voice when I say that 
in some years of working that traditionalist side of the street I found 
too many doors remained closed. 
Rather than tax you with these personal details I propose a brief 
look at two subjects well within the province of traditional political 
science, and certainly of great practical and political significance in our 
world today. The first concerns the spread of parhamentary institutions 
within the Commonwealth of Nations in the period since the Second 
World War. Although the responsibility for this process has been 
mainly Great Britain's, the successful grafting of a parhamentary 
system onto the body politic of Papua-New Guinea is one of the most 
challenging problems to confront the Austrahan government, and 
many of us would feel it quite proper as political scientists to add that 
it places a weighty moral responsibflity on the whole Australian 
community. The second is that hardy perennial, the health or decay 
of the Australian party system, a matter that reaches a certain promi-
nence in a few weeks' time but is rarely off the front page or out of the 
editorial columns for more than a week or two. I hope that I will be 
able to convince you that behavioural studies enable us to understand 
both matters better, and indeed that some aspects of each are incompre-
hensible without the sort of information and interpretation which only 
behaviouralism can provide. 
If we look at the Commonwealth of Nations at the end of the 
Second World War we find that apart from the old Dominions 
13 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
setded from Britain and Europe, and the Indian Empire with which 
can be grouped Ceylon even though it came under the responsibihty 
of the Colonial Office, fewer than a dozen territories had repre-
sentative legislatures, that is to say local parliaments in which there 
were a majority of elected representatives. These were colonies with 
predominantly African populations but long histories of representative 
government in the Caribbean and North Atlantic, and with European 
populations in the Mediterranean. The process of constitutional 
development had already begun with Jamaica in 1944, but this was 
more a case of restoring lost institutions than complete innovation. 
The story really begins in 1946 when new constitutions were 
inaugurated for Ceylon, Malaya, and Singapore in Asia, and the Gold 
Coast and Nigeria in Africa. Within ten years the Gold Coast and 
Malaya became independent; Cyprus and Nigeria followed in i960. 
Sierra Leone and Tanganyika in 1961, and today the only British 
colonies still non-independent (for hardly any are still non-self-
governing within the meaning of that cumbersome word) are those 
which are very small, or have plural societies which delayed consti-
tutional progress, or are very peculiar cases — hke Hong Kong and 
Gibraltar. 
One part of this story is a history of constitition-making: in one 
busy year from 15 June 1959 to 23 June i960 the Colonial Office 
produced 92 separate constitutional instruments totalling 500 printed 
pages. It is history that has been well written by authorities like 
Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray and Professor Stanley De Smith. It begins 
with the devising of complex legislatures and fancy franchises, and 
forms of executive government designed to train new rulers and 
transfer power, and then turns into the provision of safeguards to 
maintain constitutional equilibrium in the final stages of self-govern-
ment before independence and after. In that stage it is concerned with 
procedures for constitutional amendment, the division of responsibility 
between central and regional governments, the retention of the 
authority of the chiefs, the protection of fundamental rights, and the 
insulation of the pubhc service, the judiciary, and the prosecuting 
function from parry politics. It is a tale told by and for the lawyers 
and constitutional historians. 
But there is another part of the story which must be traced in the 
biographies of charismatic leaders, in the histories of mass parties and 
modernizing elites, in the communication of vapid ideologies, in the 
rise of new socio-economic classes, which escapes the lawyers' tech-
14 
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niques. It has been told by two different groups of writers. One, almost 
entirely American, has relied on brief acquaintance with the territory 
or territories studied, and probably been overly dependent on secondary 
sources. Its preoccupations have been those of the behaviouralists 
listed by Easton which I quoted a few minutes ago; in particular they 
have sought regularities and systematization, and they have employed 
material drawn from other social sciences. At times stylistic lapses 
have clouded the merit of what they had to say. The other group of 
writers, mainly British, have worked from longer knowledge of their 
territories. They have sought "to tell the tale" of what actually 
happened; in the main they have avoided generalizing from one 
territory to a pattern for all emergent states. A juxtaposition of two 
first-class works from each group can be made with David Apter's 
The Gold Coast itt Tratisition and Dennis Austin's Politics in Ghana, 
1946-1960, and we might well take the Gold Coast-Ghana as the test 
case for our argument. The broad outline of events is known to most 
people; the promise of the years from 1946 to 1957 had a meaning 
for many liberals (with a small "1") reminiscent almost of the events 
of 1917 which the tragic years that followed have not quite dispelled; 
Kwame Nkrumah's career between his return to Accra in December 
1947 and his exile in February of this year comes close to the classic 
requirements of tragedy, even though he falls short of the proportions 
of the tragic hero. 
The question that we must ask is what went wrong with the promise 
that the institutions of parhamentary democracy could be transplanted 
to the fertile soil of the Gold Coast. In its level of education, its degree 
of urbanization, the steady growth of communications, its healthy 
trade, rising government revenues, weak tribalism, able traditional and 
modernized indigenous leaders, the Gold Coast looked the best bet 
the Colonial Office had in Africa. The colonial administration appeared 
to have done the right things: the first Africans were appointed to 
Executive Council and as Assistant District Commissioners as early as 
1942; adult suffrage was introduced in municipal elections in 1943; 
local government was reformed in 1944; in 1946 Sir Alan Burns 
merged Ashanti and the Gold Coast Colony under a single legislature 
with an unofficial majority. Yet in 1948 the Accra riots produced 
29 dead and 200 injured. So effectively had British rule imposed law 
and order that this sudden outburst of violence was seen as evidence 
of an extreme pathological situation, and the pace of change was 
accelerated — as it had been in the Caribbean in the 1930's. The 
15 
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Convention People's Party combined a nationalist struggle of the 
whole people against colonial rule with an internal struggle of the 
common people against the chiefs, and won both. Probably the key 
to our question lies in the period between 1946 and 1951; it is a period 
dominated by three remarkable men, the reforming Governor who 
succeeded Burns, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, the nationalist lawyer-
intellectual Dr. Danquah, and the revolutionary politician organizer 
Dr. Nkrumah. The model colony evolved a national parhamentary 
system, and political stagnation turned to reform and then revolution. 
Following the riots the nationahst movement spht between Danquah 
and the intellectuals and Nkrumah and the verandah boys; the 
intellectuals rejoined the chiefs with whom they had been in conflict 
since the 1920's, but the chiefs had swung behind the colonial ad-
ministration. Africanization went on apace; in 1949 only 14 per cent 
of senior posts were held by Africans, in 1954 the proportion was 
38 per cent; in 1950 an African, A. L. Adu, was appointed C o m -
missioner for Africanisation and six Africans were appointed principal 
assistant secretaries to understudy the permanent heads they would 
soon succeed. In 1952 the creation of a new type of local authority, 
two-thirds elected, gave rank-and-file politicians their chance at office. 
The C.P.P. mushroomed: within 18 months of taking office in 1951 
it had 700,000 members in 500 branches. Nevertheless an effective 
opposition seemed secure: at the last election before independence the 
C.P.P. could muster only 57 per cent of the vote even though it won 
71 of the 104 seats; with majorities of voters and seats in Ashanti and 
the Northern Territories respectively, the National Liberation Move-
ment and the Northern People's Party, if they could maintain an 
alliance, seemed sohdly based to carry on the duties of an opposition. 
At the time of independence the Ghanaian constitution provided 
a number of checks on the basic institutions of parliamentary govern-
ment taken over from Great Britain. The second chambers for chiefs 
established in each region were certainly something more than a 
House of Lords returned to the Heptarchy; regional assemblies were 
created and given responsibilities wliich, if well short of federalism, 
were certainly more substantial than local government authorities 
enjoyed in the United Kingdom; constitutional amendment required 
a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Assembly, and certain essential 
clauses required the consent of two-thirds of the Regional Assembhes 
as well; public and judicial service commissions were created to advise 
the Governor-General, retained as head of state, on appointments. 
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Compared with the later models of constitution to come out of Great 
Smith Street this was simplicity indeed — contrast it, for example, 
with the elaborate rigidities of the Cyprus constitution. Nevertheless, 
it was a deliberate attempt to create a constitutional equilibrium 
unknown to the British constitution, based on the principle of parlia-
mentary supremacy; to a limited extent, unsuccessful as we shall see, 
it sought to go beyond "parchment barriers against the encroaching 
spirit of power" (the phrase is Madison's) by ensuring that the more 
feeble departments had adequate defences against the more powerful. 
One of the quite remarkable developments in this history of consti-
tution-making was the conversion of the Whitehall and Westminster 
law-givers from parliamentary supremacy and the civil rights provided 
by the common law to checks and balances and bills of rights, both 
of the older bourgeois variety and the newer welfare state sort. Look 
at the innate hostihty of the Englishmen considering an Indian consti-
tution in the Simon Commission and the Joint Select Committee on 
the Government of India Bill to the idea of legislating for liberty: the 
most effective way of subverting human rights, they said, thinking of 
central Europe between the wars, was to embody them in a constitution. 
Then look at the bills of rights, some enforced and some not, in the 
constitutions of about a dozen of the new full members of the 
Commonwealth of Nations. They are an attempt to maintain a sort 
of constitutional equihbrium between state and citizen, and between 
para-governmental organizations within society so that, for example, 
one party may not destroy its rivals. 
Although both India and Malaya had adopted bills of rights before 
Ghana became independent, they had done so of their own volition 
or on the recommendation of a predominantly non-British constitu-
tional commission. Nigeria in 1959 was the first erstwhile colony to 
have its bill of rights supplied by Great Smith Street. The Gold Coast 
had had a constitutional provision prohibiting racial discrimination as 
early as 1950, and the independence constitution guaranteed rehgious 
freedom and adequate compensation for the compulsory acquisition 
of land, but the Nkrumah government met the demands of the 
opposition for more elaborate provisions with a plea of lack of time 
to prepare them. And so the implementation of the 1957 constitution 
was the last act of faith in a long series of acts of faith. The regional 
assemblies, a critical ingredient in the system of checks and balances, 
the equilibrium system which was to prevent any one group from 
becoming too powerful, were left for the attention of the post-
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independence regime. Although the commission to define their 
powers recommended a wide list, when the regional assemblies were 
set up by the Nkrumah government in September 1958 they had 
advisory powers only. In protest, the opposition boycotted the 
elections; the C.P.P. won all the places, then used its control of the 
National Assembly and the regional assemblies to amend the provision 
of the constitution relating to constitutional amendment so that 
thereafter only a simple majority of the national parliament would be 
required to amend the constitution in December 1958; in March 1959 
the regional assemblies were wound up, their usefulness gone. This was 
the attack on the principal system of checks and balances, but it 
was reinforced by the destruction of alternative power groups: tribal 
or regional parties were prohibited in December 1957; anti-C.P.P. 
chiefs were destooled and replaced with party supporters; regional 
commissioners were appointed, and proved to be party officers rather 
than public servants — as Dennis Austin described it: 
The fusion of party and government power was thus demonstrated 
as clearly as it could be at local and regional level: the party boss 
sat in the former colonial commissioner's office, and presided over 
an administrative hierarchy arranged much as in colonial times, 
which he now placed at the service of the party; 
a series of repressive acts was introduced, and, following claims of 
various plots, members of the opposition were dealt with; the govern-
ment won some by-elections and a number of opposition parlia-
mentarians defected to the government. By i960, of the thirty-two 
opposition members elected in 1956, three were in preventive detention, 
one in exile, and twelve sat on the government benches. In that year 
a plebiscite endorsed a new repubhcan constitution and elected Dr. 
Nkrumah president: the vote for the constitution was 88.5 per cent 
and for Nkrumah 89.1 per cent. The other candidate for the presidency 
was Dr. Danquah who polled only 10.9 per cent; a year later Danquah 
and a number of the opposition were detained — Danquah eventually 
died in custody. The regime continued to strike against rival centres 
of power —the trade unions, the cooperatives, in 1963 the judiciary, 
m 1964 the army and police. All the haUmarks of totahtariamsm 
appeared. Yet, in February the regime fell with a loss of life one-quarter 
that of the Accra riots of 1948. 
We have two different questions then — why did Nkrumah and 
the C.P.P. advance so steadily on the road to totalitarianism, and why 
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did the regime crumble so swifdy? One immediate answer to the 
second question comes from economics: the regime was squeezed out 
between falling cocoa prices and the inefficiencies of galloping socialism. 
But it is an answer which has to be translated into politics: the 
intellectuals of Ghana, that is to say, those with completed secondary 
or tertiary education, defeated by Nkrumah at the polls, saw his 
regime as an attack on their standards of hving through shortages and 
high taxes as well as an attack on their prestige; an abortive compulsory 
savings scheme (one had caused riots in British Guiana) and a steep 
incidence of income taxation worsened their position still further. 
The attack on their economic position was compounded with the 
attack on the status of the civil service: victimization for errors of 
judgment by political superiors; subordination to inefficient party 
hacks; pohticization of the public service through compulsory ideo-
logical lectures; nepotism; widespread corruption and violation of the 
service's ethical code. It might be that, paradoxically, when the 
constitutional checks and balances introduced belatedly by Britain in 
the last moment of doubt before independence were swept away, the 
real protection of parliamentary institutions in Ghana came from 
the same factors that operate in Britain, the belief of most men of 
power and influence that they should be preserved and made to work. 
It is too early to say whether the National Liberation Council led by 
General Ankrah will in fact restore parliamentary government; one 
interested bystander, Mr. Geoffrey Bing, Dr. Nkrumah's English 
attorney-general, has warned against comparisons between General 
Ankrah and General Monk, and the few vague statements about the 
constitution to be introduced, perhaps two years from now, suggest 
that it wiU return to checks and balances rather than parliamentary 
supremacy. Most commentators agree that the return of the intellectuals 
to their pre-1948 power could again be reversed by a new popular 
or popuhst movement, perhaps even the C.P.P. under a new leader 
or Nkrumah back from exile. 
But an understanding of the ideology of the civil service-nulitary-
professional-intellectual ehte of Ghana involves their position as a 
privileged socio-economic class, just as an understanding of the 
populist ideology of the verandah boys must be seen in terms of their 
derivation from a rapid expansion of primary education; the alternative 
is to accept Nkrumahism and consciencism on its own waffly terms. 
An understanding of the three great men of the period is more likely 
to come from their biographies than from their pubHshed papers; 
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Dennis Austm has already offered one tentative epitaph for Nkrumah: 
I do not mean that he was evil or even vicious: the main impression 
that he leaves behind is one of sillmess, of a rather weak man in 
a very powerful position, whose capacity for self-deception and 
misjudgement was on the grand scale. He was also vain, although 
I suspect that his vanity was partly a cloak for a lack of self-
assurance (stemming possibly from his eariy years at a not very 
good negro college in the United States). It made him an easy 
prey to those who found it profitable to flatter. 
Interpretative biographies of Nkrumah, Danquah, and Arden-Clarke 
must draw on the techniques of psychology. W e need to know much 
more about the impact of Africanization on the civil service, about 
the ebb and flow of power within local government between the 
chiefs and the educated comnioners, about the effect of the mass party 
on village society, of the extent to which tribalism operated in the 
latter days of the Nkrumah regime and operates, apparently with 
reverse effects, under the National Liberation Council. W e need to 
utilize an equilibrium model of the Ghanaian political system and to 
feed into it the elements which only elaborate behaviouralist studies of 
Ghanaian society and history and economics and politics can provide. 
Only thereby can we understand why the constitutional equilibrium 
of 1957 failed, and what are the prospects of establishing a new one; 
only thereby can we comprehend the seamless web of government. 
Turn now to our second area of attention this evening, the Australian 
parry system. By party system here I mean that combination of several 
parties and the electorate whereby, in Talcott Parsons' terms, the 
parties offer to the electorate effective leadership and binding decisions 
(bmding because one party or a combination of two or more will take 
control of state machinery by reason of electoral success), and the 
electorate offer to the parties generalized support and advocacy of 
pohcies. I shall not digress on the usefulness of a party system, how 
It permits changes of power-holders without upsetting the balance, 
but it should be noted at once that the maintenance of a genume 
party system depends on definite institutional conditions: the losing 
party accepts the result without its loyalty to the system being im-
paired, and the winner is restrained in using its power to suppress the 
opposition. Among various party systems the two-party model has 
certam virtues; it centralizes power and mobihzes support from 
divergent sources while continuing to offer voters a genuine alternative. 
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As K. B. Smellie put it: 
There is a peculiar paradox about this. Each party feels that it 
could convert the whole community. Each party claims to 
represent the whole community. This is the essential advantage 
of the two-party system as compared with a system of groups. 
For though m theory a group system wiU reach unity by the 
arbitrament of reason between them, in practice reason will give 
way to barter. In a two-party system it is possible for a community 
to adapt itself by trial and error to a changing world. 
By and large Australia has a two-party system. Events between 
1890 and 1910 suggested that a three-party system could operate for 
brief periods, but since Fusion there have been basically only two 
parties, the Australian Labor Party and the principal anti-Labor or 
non-Labor party under a succession of names. The Country Party, 
for purposes of party system analysis at least, is not an independent 
actor — though the Country and Liberal parties, like George and 
Martha, sometimes have their httle private games which fiU spectators 
with terror and appear to take a lot out of them too. And, so far at 
least, the Democratic Labor Party, whatever its long-term aspirations, 
can best be regarded as a potential element of the Liberal-Country 
coahtion. 
This two-party system has been maintained for 55 years. In the 
United States a two-party system comprising the same two parties 
has lasted a century. In Britain, apart from a transitional period in 
which the Labour Party was replacing the Liberal Party, a two-party 
system is equally old — indeed the more imaginative political historians 
are ready to trace it back through various manifestations to the Civil 
War. A number of spasmodic and fairly casual efforts have been made 
to explain this remarkable stability, and in popular discourse the 
phenomenon is usually described as the swing of the pendulum. 
Rather more attention has been given to the subject in Britain and the 
United States than in Austraha, and so the explanations I have to 
report come from those countries rather than locally — but as this 
is the case with so much theorizing about Austrahan pohtics it need 
not disturb us. 
One set of explanations comes from Sir Ivor Jennings in his httle 
book, The British Constitution. (In the later editions of the work he even 
provided a graphic illustration of the pendulum at work, suspended 
from the hands of Big Ben.) Some of the difficulties of coming to grips 
at 
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^^ith an explanation of the phenomenon are suggested by the fact that 
Sir Ivor 111 successive editions accumulated a number of explanations, 
each of which he says is the real one. Originally, and most unreahs-
tically, he employed the rational and informed voter of classic 
democratic theory: 
With us, the majority is not permanent. It is based upon differing 
views of personal and national interest, views which are susceptible 
of change and, in a sufficient number of persons, do change from 
time to time. Not only do persons fluctuate, but they fluctuate 
sometimes violcndy, and the "swing of the pendulum" is a 
familiar feature of British politics. Consequentiy, parties can and 
do appeal to reason. 
To this he added the argument of inevitability: 
AU Governments become unpopular in the end: it is to this fact 
that we owe the changes of Government which we call the 
"swing of the pendulum". . . 
Next he returned to rational persuasion: 
What the Opposition says may be so persuasive that the "floating 
vote" may "swing the pendulum". Ministers must answer 
argument by argument; they must meet a half-truth by a whole 
truth (or a more attractive half-truth) lest it go round the country. 
In this way the appeal to the people is not an occasional ceremony, 
but a process which goes on daily and hourly in the parliamentary 
session. 
And finally, responding a httle to the studies of voting behaviour 
which had appeared since the first edition, he concluded: 
. . . The phenomenon of the "swing of the pendulum" is very 
largely due to the continual process by which young electors are 
substituted for those who die. Having no party loyalties as yet, 
and accepting the view of the young that the "old gang" is 
behaving stupidly, the young voters tend to vote against that 
party and so to determine their own political affiharions for a 
generation. 
Another set of seven explanations drawn from a number of writers 
about American pohtics, is provided by Stokes and Iversen. There is a 
tendency, it is claimed, for interest groups to remember the favours 
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a government has dispensed less well than those which it has not 
given. The party out of power can make extravagant promises, while 
the party in power is limited by what it can deliver. There is a greater 
motivational response to a government's mistakes than to its successes. 
The party in power is liable to disastrous splits as its majority grows 
and electoral pressure on it lessens. The pohtical cycle responds to the 
business cycle, generating support for the opposition in periods of 
economic decline (evidenced in Australian politics by the proposition 
that every government in power at the start of the depression was 
promptly turned out ^ though this needs a bit of qualification for 
Tasmania). The population has alternating moods of conservatism and 
radicalism. There is a popular belief in rotation in office — noted by 
Sir Robert Menzies in his 1963 policy speech when he warned the 
voters under thirty-five who had never known a socialist government 
against "the old cry 'it's time for a change!' " and explained that 
change was a good thing only when it was a change for the better. 
Stokes and Iversen point out that in a hundred years neither American 
party has succeeded in winning more than 65 per cent of the vote, 
even though there has been an average fluctuation of almost 6 per cent 
in every four-year inter-presidential-election period, and calculate 
that there is a chance less than five in a hundred of this having occurred 
randomly if the system was totally free of equilibrium forces ("factors 
tending to return the party division to 50 per cent in the long run") . 
In Australia no party has ever got beyond the 60 per cent mark. 
How can we explain this remarkable occurrence? 
The first thing is to recognize that there are two main influences 
operating upon electoral decision — long-term dispositions and more 
recent transitory influences. Behaviouralist voting studies of the past 
twenty years tell us a great deal about each. As to the long-term 
dispositions, we know that individuals tend to vote as members of 
social groups; political attitudes are stabilized in terms of association 
with other members of the principal basic social groups in which the 
voter is involved; as Talcott Parsons put it, it is not for what he is 
voting but with whom he is voting — and Rawson's study of Parkes 
voters supports the application of this view to Australia —"a person 
should feel most secure in associating himself with persons who, by 
virtue of their real sohdary relationship to him, are the ones he feels 
most naturally can be trusted". It is as a structure of groups that 
society is most stable and integrated, and changes most slowly. The 
individual voter is socialized into his pohtical attitudes, not, as Sir Ivor 
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Jennings suggested, on casting his first vote, nor at the moment of 
birth, as Private Willis of the Guards beheved in lolanthe, but in his 
mid and late teens; one consequence is the remarkably high positive 
correlation between the voter's political allegiance and that of his 
parents, ranging from .8 to .9. 
These long-term dispositions affect the transitory influences; they 
arc both an inertia component which determines voting unless 
overcome by short-term forces in the immediate situation and they 
also colour the information about these new issues. New elements of 
politics are mistaken for old, or bent until they resemble them; the 
voter's very motivation to attend to political communications directed 
at him is affected. Admittedly some elements of political reality do 
make their way through this perceptive screen; the more substantial 
and simple to comprehend they are, the more easily they do so — war, 
depression, and the like. And at times other identifications, with 
relicfious or ethnic groups or class, may cause the voter to perceive 
political objects in a way that clashes with his basic partisanship. 
Overiying and containing both influences are the ingredients of 
consensus, the elements of what Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba 
have dubbed "the civic culture", concerning, for example, the charac-
teristics of candidates, the relevant criteria on which to judge them, 
expectations of the voting tendencies of blocs of voters, and perhaps 
agreements on what the major issues of the campaign are or expecta-
tions of the future. 
I think that I have said enough to show that, as the result of 
behavioural studies, we have a pretty fair idea of what slows down 
the swings of the pendulum. Demographic changes in the electorate 
can contribute their share to setting it going, but studies of voters 
under thirty years of age certainly indicate no more than the slightest 
bias in their behaviour compared with the rest of the voting population. 
Rational persuasion may set it going, but the rational policy-oriented 
element is far smaller than traditional political scientists had ever 
conceded. 
The evidence of what arrests the swing and sends it moving back 
in the opposite direction is rather less satisfactory. In so far as no 
empirical study has yet discovered any widely held belief in the virtues 
of alternation in office, there is some reason for doubting whether this 
IS an element in the civic cultures of two-party system populations. 
Nor, given the armoury of economic weapons available to con-
temporary administrations, is there any particular reason why a 
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government need blunder out of office, though the prevalence of 
stop-go policies in many countries suggests that these skills are not 
completely mastered. Unfortunately behavioural studies in Australia 
have yet had no opportunity to consider a change in government, 
nor, because of their expense, have a sufficient number been undertaken 
to catch such temporary reversals as 1961. In Britain the behavioural 
studies of 1964 have yet to be published. Only from the United States 
do we have reports of what happens when a pendulum swings an 
administration out of office — in 1952 and i960. Both occasions were 
comphcated by the juxtaposition of the personal popularity of General 
Eisenhower against what can be seen as a normal Democratic majority 
and its subsequent withdrawal. 
If I may hazard a guess as to what will eventually be proven, 
I suspect the answer will be found in behavioural studies not so much 
of the electorate as of the parties. The first work in this field has shown 
that the scarcity of information and the prevalence of inaccurate 
information extends from the voters into at least the bottom and 
middle tiers of party management. Party leaders too wear perceptional 
spectacles which are tinted and distorting, and they derive them from 
long-term dispositions of the sort which affect voters. The organiza-
tional structures of parties, their political sociology in the widest sense 
of that phrase, prevent them from being the office-seeking rational 
bodies which earlier models demanded, and in some parties these 
rigidities are more restrictive than in others. W e need to establish the 
elements of the Australian civic culture, partly to see how correct were 
the estimates of the operative concepts of the state in Australia provided 
by Hancock and Encel. W e need to ascertain how far those who 
qualify or seek to qualify for pohtical leadership differ in these respects 
from the bulk of the population. In 1908 Graham Wallas called atten-
tion to the irrational element in politics, but we have still to draw 
accurate boundaries of the extent of its intervention. 
I have tried to suggest in these two instances that the emphasis of 
traditional political science on formal structures and historical or 
genetic processes fails to account for the phenomena we have examined: 
the rapid changes of politics in the Gold Coast-Ghana and the slow 
ebb and flow of Australian politics. I should perhaps add that the 
selection of the Gold Coast-Ghana to illustrate our general point about 
the spread of parliamentary institutions has not unduly biased the 
argument; this particular territory has compressed rather more changes 
into twenty years than most, but there are few features in which 
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it is in any way unique: one could have taken British Guiana, or 
Cvprus, or Nigeria, or Tanzania, and much of the story would have 
been the same. Without rendering the argument too explicit, I hope 
that the advantages of using an equilibrium model to understand each, 
the Ghanaian political system and the Australian party system, have 
emerged. The parts of each system are mutually interdependent and 
what affects one affects all; the parts tend to cohere; yet change can 
and does take place within each system. To identify and understand 
each part, to seek to trace the interrelationships between them, even 
to try to measure the force which each applies to the other parts, to 
seek regularities to be expressed as generalizations and to seek to verify 
these by comparison with other modernizing societies and other 
Western party systems, is to wed the equihbrium model to the 
behavioural approach. I think that it is the most profitable way in 
which to conduct research in political science at the present time. 
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